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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The defendant/respondent Brian G. Herold ("hereinafter referred to as 
"Herold") recognizes that this court has jurisdiction over the issues set forth 
in the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by the plaintiff/petitioner Marvin A. 
Dalton, Jr . ("hereinafter referred to as "Dalton"). Herold, however, takes issue 
with the s ta tement of jurisdiction submitted by Dalton questioning 
jurisdiction because Herold directly appealed the trial court's granting of an 
additur. Additionally, that issue is not appropriately before this court in that 
it was not set forth in the petition for a writ of certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in viewing "the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to [the 
jury's] verdict?" 
Standard: For there to be a successful attack of a jury verdict, all of 
the evidence supporting the verdict must be marshaled and demonstrated 
that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Crookston v. Fire 
Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991); Von Hake u. Thomas, 705 
P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). The facts are to be viewed and recited in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict whenever an appeal is considered that 
involves a jury's verdict. Crookston at 794; Von Hake at 769. "[W]hen the 
damages are not so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of the evidence by 
the jury, a court is not empowered to en te r ta in a motion for an additur." 
Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1981). (Emphasis added.) 
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals en" by not allowing oral argument? 
Standard: Oral argument on appeal is not a right bestowed on the 
parties. The Court of Appeals may exercise its discretion not to hear argument 
if the "decisional process would not be significantly aided." Rule 29 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEDURES 
AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURTS BELOW 
On June 11, 1992, Dalton filed a complaint of negligence against Herold. 
Dalton asserted that on October 15, 1990, Dalton was riding his motorcycle 
northbound on 900 West in Salt Lake City, Utah. Herold was making a left-
hand turn from 900 West onto North Temple. An accident occurred between 
the parties in the middle of the intersection. At the time of the accident, 
Dalton was not wearing a protective helmet. Dalton claimed that he suffered 
personal injuries with associated past and future medical expenses. 
Shortly after the accident, Dalton was incarcerated. Later, Dalton 
entered a plea of guilty to the third degree felony of burglary. Prior to trial, 
the parties agreed that Dalton would not make any claims for lost wages or 
make any reference to how his alleged physical limitations would relate to 
employment in exchange for Herold not attempting to introduce evidence 
regarding Dalton's incarceration or criminal record. (R.373) Accordingly, the 
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jury was not presented with any evidence of whether Dalton could afford to 
obtain proper medical care or, in fact, receive free medical care while in jail. 
On May 5, 1993, and pursuant to Rule 68(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Herold filed an offer of judgment in the amount of $15,000. (R. 62-
64) That offer was rejected by Dalton and this matter was tried to a jury on 
May 17 through 19, 1993. The jury's verdict was considerably below the offer 
of judgment. 
After the conclusion of the evidence at trial, the court directed the jury 
to find that Herold was negligent. The remaining issues were submitted to the 
jury on a special verdict forms. The jury found Dalton to have been negligent 
and both parties' negligence to be a proximate cause of Dalton's injuries. The 
jury concluded that Dalton was 20% at fault and that Herold was 80% at 
fault. Finally, the jury awarded special damages in the amount of $3,000 and 
general damages in the amount of $5,000. (R. 292) 
Upon motions of the plaintiff, the trial court found the amount of the 
jury's verdict to be "clearly inadequate in light of the evidence presented at 
the trial" and "not consistent with any actual special damages." Dalton's 
motion for additur was granted and the court increased the award of special 
damages from the jury's verdict of $3,000.00 to a total of $22,910.24. The court 
did not alter the portion of the jury's verdict which found Dalton 20% at fault 
for his own injuries or the award of $5,000.00 in general damages. 
On September 27, 1993, the trial court issued a memorandum decision 
granting Dalton's motion for additur. (See Exhibit A-4 in the petitioner's 
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appendix.) On January 24, 1994, the trial court entered its final judgment 
and order regarding plaintiffs post-trial motion for verified costs and 
expenses. (See Exhibit A-5 in the petitioner's appendix.) 
Herold appealed the District Court's memorandum decision and 
judgment. That appeal was addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals. In an 
effort to determine whether the trial court was "empowered to entertain a 
motion for an additur", the Court of Appeals correctly examined the evidence 
and determined that "the evidence does not compel a finding that reasonable 
persons would have reached a different measure of damages." That court cited 
Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1981). The Court of Appeals found 
that the "trial court should never have considered the motion for additur 
since the record does not show that the jury disregarded the evidence." (See 
the memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals attached as Exhibit A-1 in 
the petitioner's appendix.) The trial court's additur of $19,910.24 was reversed 
and the original jury award of special damages in the amount of $3,000 was 
reinstated. 
It should be noted that Dalton's presentation of what he considers to be 
the "correct standard of review applied to a trial court's ultimate decision to 
grant an additur" was placed squarely before the Court of Appeals both in the 
brief of the appellee and in his petition for rehearing. Dalton set forth the 
same basis in his petition for certiorari on page 2 of his petition for rehearing 
when he stated: 
In short, [the Court of Appeals] mistakenly reviewed the 
verdict directly without considering the intermediate action 
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[additur decision] by the trial court. See Andreason v. 
Aetna Casualty Company, 848 P.2d 171. 174 (Utah App. 
1993). Had the court applied the correct standard of view 
[sic], it would have reached a different conclusion. 
Additionally, the petition for rehearing sets forth Dalton's argument that an 
"oral presentation explaining the correct standard of review ... would have 
prevented this Court from picking the wrong standard of review ... ." (See 
petition for rehearing pp. 8, 9.) Despite Dalton's extensive briefing on the same 
issues that are now before this court, the Court of Appeals denied his petition 
for rehearing. 
In the brief of Dalton, for the first time, he maintains that Herold had no 
right to appeal the trial court's additur. Herold never "accepted" the additur 
in any fashion. Dalton admits that "this issue was not presented to the Court 
of Appeals." (See Brief of Plaintiff/Petitioner at page 21.) Additionally, the 
claim that Herold "accepted" the additur and is banned from appealing that 
judgment was not set forth in Dalton's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
Accordingly, because those issues are not properly before the court at this 
time, Herold will not address that issue herein unless this court requires 
additional briefing. See Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862, 864 n. 3 
(Utah 1995). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On October 15, 1990, immediately prior to the accident, Herold 
was the second car stopped at a red light at the intersection of 900 West and 
North Temple in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 611) 
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2. Herold was facing south and intending to make a left-hand turn. 
(R. 612) 
3. At the time of the accident, the traffic signals at the intersection 
in question did not provide a left-hand turn arrow. 
4. Dalton was northbound on his motorcycle on 900 West. (R. 640) 
5. Dalton was not wearing a protective helmet. (Dalton has never 
worn a helmet while riding his motorcycle.) (R. 684) 
6. As soon as the light turned green, Herold followed the vehicle in 
front of him in making a left-hand turn. (R. 680) 
7. While approaching the intersection, Dalton had actually seen the 
green light for approximately four to six seconds before he passed the 
beginning of the left-hand turn lane for northbound traffic which is a 
considerable distance before the intersection. (R. 677-678) 
8. Dalton had a clear view of Herold and the car ahead of Herold. 
(R. 680) 
9. In attempting to stop, Dalton claimed to have locked up his 
brakes, yet no skid marks were left by his motorcycle. (R. 680-681) 
10. Dalton hit the very end of the Herold vehicle on its right rear 
quarter panel. (R. 685) 
11. At the scene of the accident, Dalton refused medical aid. (R. 685-
686) 
12. Later on the day of the accident, Dalton was treated at the 
emergency room of Holy Cross Hospital and released. (October 15, 1990). 
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13. j While at the emergency room, Dalton did not wish to have a 
plastic surgeon consulted. (R. 240, p. 2 of Holy Cross emergency department 
report). 
14. Dalton was next examined by Dr. James Morgan, an orthopedic 
surgeon, almost two months later on December 6, 1990. (R. 748-749) 
15. Dr. Morgan saw Dalton only one other time on January 24, 1991; 
by that time Dalton's knee injury had returned to about pre-injury level, 
although he continued to have numbness of his face, right arm and hand. (R. 
756) 
16. Dalton saw Dr. Richard Hodnett, a plastic surgeon, on only one 
occasion on December 17, 1990; no treatment was rendered. (R. 766) 
17. Dr. Hodnett asked Dalton to return; Dalton did not return. 
(R.784) 
18. It is the policy of Dr. Hodnett's office to "call and ask the patient 
to come in for a repeat exam." (R. 785) 
19. In December of 1990, Dr. Hodnett "thought that, at that late of 
date, [Dalton] may need more extensive treatment than he would have needed 
if [Dr. Hodnett had] seen him within the first couple weeks of when [the 
accident] happened." (R. 769) 
20. When asked at trial whether Dalton needed surgery approximately 
two and one-half years after Dr. Hodnett last saw Dalton and had x-rays 
taken. Dr. Hodnett stated: "It's difficult, since I haven't been able to examine 
Mr. Dalton". (R. 781) 
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21. Dalton received no treatment from any of the physicians who 
examined him (Dr. Morgan, Dr. Hodnett, Dr. Cosby, Dr. Mikesell, and Dr. 
Stadler) for his alleged injuries related to the accident in question. (R. 696) 
22. Dalton did not follow his doctors' recommendations which would 
have mitigated his damages. (R. 702) 
23. When Dalton saw Dr. Michael P. Cosby, an oral and maxillofacial 
surgeon, on December 16, 1991 for his temporal mandibular joint concerns, 
Dalton had one tooth actually rotted down to the roots. (R. 827-28) 
24. When Dalton saw Dr. L. Vaun Mikesell, his second expert in the 
area of oral and maxillofacial surgery, shortly before trial on February 23, 
1993, Dalton had eight teeth that had severe cavities and may need to be 
extracted. (R. 858) 
25. In a letter to Dalton's attorney dated December 26, 1991. Dr. 
Cosby recommended that Dalton have his teeth cleaned. (R. 849) 
26. Dalton did not follow the recommendation to have his teeth 
cleaned. (R. 702) 
27. Dr. Cosby recommended that Dalton exercise appropriate dental 
hygiene. (R. 849) 
28. Dalton "just turned lazy" and did not exercise appropriate dental 
hygiene. (R. 702) 
29. Dr. Cosby recommended the removal of non-restored teeth and the 
restoration of restorable teeth. (R. 849) 
30. Dalton did not obtain appropriate dental care. (R. 702) 
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31. Dr. Cosby recommended tha t Dalton be evaluated for spl int 
therapy. (R. 849) 
32. Dal ton did not follow th rough in being eva lua ted for spl in t 
therapy. (R. 702) 
33. It was Dr. Cosby's "feeling conservative t r ea tmen t would be all 
tha t would be needed. Most likely, splint therapy would alleviate most of the 
myalgia and symptoms of TMJ dysfunction which [Dalton] is experiencing." 
34. Dr. Mikesell testified tha t splint therapy would cost "around $300 
to $400." (R. 834) 
35. Dalton did not obtain splint therapy when recommended by Dr. 
Cosby and his TMJ condition became worse. (R. 838) 
36. When Dalton was examined by Dr. Cosby, Dalton's mouth opening 
was in the range of normal. (R. 845) 
37. When Dalton was examined by Dr. Cosby, there was no clicking or 
popping of the jaw to palpation. (R. 846) 
38. It did not appear from Dr. Mikesell's examinat ion tha t Dalton 
followed any of the recommendat ions set forth by Dr. Cosby. (R. 850) 
39. Even at the time of trial, Dr. Mikesell would begin t r ea tmen t 
conservatively and only if Dalton's condition did not respond would surgery 
be considered. (R. 850) 
40. Dr. Cosby ' s bill to Dal ton ' s a t t o rney w a s $ 6 5 . 0 0 for the 
examination and $200 for the report sent to Dalton's attorney; the report is an 
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expense of litigation, not a medical bill. (R. 240, Dr. Cosby's itemization of 
charges and payments.) 
41. Dalton's past medical expenses equal $2,703.24, which represents 
the $2,903.24 figure presented by Dalton at trial, less $200 for Dr. Cosby's 
report to Dalton's attorney. 
42. If one were to add $300.00 for conservative splint therapy 
treatment for future special damages to the past medical special damages, the 
total special damage figure would be within $3.24 of the jury's special damage 
award of $3,000.00. 
43. The plaintiff was examined by Dr. E. Warren Stadler, an expert in 
the area of physical rehabilitation, on February 22, 1993. (R. 864) 
44. At the time of Dr. Stadler's examination. Dalton had a full range 
of motion of the cervical spine without weakness in the upper extremity or the 
neck area. (R. 869) 
45. Dr. Stadler's examination found decreased sensation in Dalton's 
right index finger and on the right facial area around the right eye. (R. 869, 
872) 
46. Dalton's loss of sensation is caused by a nerve problem. (R. 873) 
47. Dr. Stadler's examination found Dalton's facial fractures to be 
well healed. (R. 872) 
48. Dr. Stadler did not place any limitation on Dalton's activities of 
daily living. (R. 873) 
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49. Dr. S tad le r did not feel that surgical intervention on Dalton 
would be helpful with regard to his knee, his neck, his shoulder, his a rm or 
with regard to his facial injuries. (R. 872-877) 
50. Su rge ry would no t be helpful in rees tab l i sh ing the sensory 
pa t t e rns for nerve problems experienced by Dalton. (R. 873) 
51. There was no need to d ispute the evidence of the cos t of the 
plaint i f fs possible future surger ies because there was direct evidence tha t 
such surgeries would not be necessary or helpful. 
52. Had the plaintiff followed Dr. Cosby's advice in December of 1991 
and obta ined spl int therapy, his symptoms of TMJ dysfunction would have 
been alleviated; no surgery to relieve those symptoms would have been 
necessary. 
53. Dr 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
54. Dr 
11 
. Stadler testified as follows: 
Now, with that , do you have an opinion as to how 
well-healed this individual was with regard to the 
fractures he experienced in his face? 
Yes. 
And wha t was tha t opinion? 
I feel tha t the fractures would be well-healed. 
Did you feel that there would be a need at the time for 
any type of surgical intervention with regard to the 
facial fractures? 
No, I would not. (R. 873). 
. Stadler further testified: 
Q: What is your opinion as to whether surgery would be 
necessary or helpful in regard to the nerve injury in 
the face? 
A: My opinion is that surgery would not be helpful. 
(R. 876) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Dalton takes the position that an appellate court in the State of Utah is 
not allowed to view the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict when considering whether a 
trial court has appropriately awarded an additur. That position has no 
foundation in Utah case law. Dalton, however, attempts to so construe the 
language set forth in Crookston. The plain language in Crookston, however, 
clearly supports the action taken by the Utah Court of Appeals in this case. 
In deciding whether to grant a new trial, a trial court has 
some discretion, and we reverse only for abuse of that 
discretion. In passing on a motion for a j.n.o.v., however, a 
trail court has no latitude and must be correct. Appellate 
review of a trial court's denial of either motion based on a 
claim of insufficiency of the evidence, however, is governed 
by one s tandard because of the differing degrees of 
discretion we accord trial courts in ruling initially on these 
motions. Under that standard, we reverse only if, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing 
party, the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. 
Crookston at 799. 
In the case at hand, the trial court did more than grant a new trial. A 
new trial would allow evidence to be presented once again to a jury. The trial 
court's additur, on the other hand, replaces the jury's verdict with the court's 
own judgment. In that light, an additur is far more similar to a judgment 
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notwithstanding the verdict than a granting of a new trial. Accordingly, the 
trial court has no latitude and must be correct. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE JURY'S VERDICT MUST STAND BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SO CLEARLY 
PREPONDERATE IN FAVOR OF DALTON THAT REASONABLE PEOPLE WOULD NOT DIFFER 
ON THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE 
The right to a jury trial in civil cases is fundamental. That right is at 
the very heart of our judicial system. It is expressly set forth in the 
Constitution of this state. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 10. 
Accordingly, the decisions rendered by juries must be protected by this court. 
This court cannot allow trial judges to ignore unanimous decisions of eight 
jurors based on their reasonable interpretation of the evidence and substitute 
the trial judge's own point of view. In reviewing a trial court's decision to 
substitute its own judgment for that of the jury's verdict, an appellate court 
must have the ability to review the record of the trial and the jury's verdict. 
Only then, can an appellate court determine whether a litigant's 
constitutional right to have a jury of his peers render judgment on his case. 
In the recent case of Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786 (Utah 1994), the 
Supreme Court of Utah re-emphasized the "well-established principal of 
appellate review" which endorses the American system of jury trials. This 
court stated on page 788 of that case the following: 
This court will upset a jury verdict 'only upon a showing 
that the evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of the 
appellant that reasonable people would not differ on the 
outcome of the case.' (Citing E.A. Strout W. Realty Agency, 
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Inc. v. W. C. Foy and Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 
1983); accord Bandy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 
758 (Utah 1984). 
Herold urges this court to stand by the well-recognized standard of appellate 
review and only allow trial judges to entertain a motion for additur when the 
damages are "so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of the evidence by the 
jury." Dupuis v. Neilson, 624 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1981). The trial court erred 
in granting Dalton's motion for additur and that decision should not be 
allowed to s tand. The trial court was wrong when it stated in its 
memorandum decision that the award for special damages rendered by the 
jury did not bear a reasonable relationship to the evidence. It is true that the 
plaintiff presented evidence alleging that his past medical bills totaled 
$2,903.24. It was pointed out to the jury that $200.00 of that amount, 
however, was for a letter sent by Dalton's expert, Dr. Crosby, to Dalton's 
attorney. Accordingly, the past medical bills actually totaled $2,703.24. If the 
conservative treatment, which was estimated at $300.00, were to have been 
undertaken by the plaintiff, the total special damages would be $3,003.24. 
Certainly, that amount bears "a reasonable relationship to the evidence." 
The trial court did recognize in its memorandum decision that Dr. 
Warren Stadler testified at trial. While it is true that Dr. Stadler, a physician 
who does not perform surgery, did not address the cost of future surgeries, he 
specifically testified that no future surgery would be necessary or helpful. 
Dalton continues to pursue the red herring and claim that Dr. Stadler's 
testimony should be ignored because he is not a surgeon. That issue was 
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addressed by the trial court when Dalton's attorney objected to Stadler's 
testimony at trial by stating: "I believe it goes to the weight, versus the 
admissibility. The objection is overruled, you may answer the question if you 
remember it ... ." (R. 876) 
It should be pointed out that both Dalton and the trial court seem to 
ignore the fact that Dalton was first examined for TMJ type symptoms by Dr. 
Michael P. Crosby in Denver, Colorado on December 26. 1991. (Dalton did not 
see Dr. Mikesell, his second expert in the area of oral and maxiofaciall surgery, 
until shortly before the trial on February 23, 1993.) Dr. Crosby's letter to 
Dalton's attorney dated December 26, 1991, attached hereto as Exhibit "1", 
clearly states that Dalton failed to mitigate his damages and that future 
surgery would not have been necessary if Dalton had taken care of his 
problem in a timely fashion. Dr. Crosby stated: "It is my feeling conservative 
treatment would be all that would be needed." The conservative treatment 
would only cost $300.00. 
The evidence presented to the jury overwhelmingly proved that Dalton 
failed to mitigate his damages. He had not received any medical treatment 
and had not followed through with any of his doctors' recommendations. Not 
only was there medical testimony that the surgeries were not necessary and 
would not be helpful, the jury reasonably inferred that the surgeries, as 
required in jury instruction number 44, that the surgeries would not have 
been required and given in the future. 
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u. 
THERE IS NO REASONABLE BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT SUBSTITUTING ITS 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
In its memorandum decision, the trial court determined that the jury's 
verdict was "manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence." The Court of 
Appeals correctly determined that the "trial court should never had considered 
the motion for additur since the record does not show that the jury 
disregarded the evidence." There is no reasonable basis for the trial court's 
decision. 
Under any conceivable standard, this court cannot allow an incorrect 
decision by a trial judge to stand. 
HL 
THE PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT REGARDING HIS THEORY AS TO THE CORRECT STANDARD 
OF REVIEW WAS REPEATEDLY AND ADEQUATELY PRESENTED IN HIS BRIEFS 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure were recommended by the 
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules and approved by the Utah Supreme 
Court. Those rules became effective on April 1, 1990. The Advisory Committee 
note indicates that prior to the adoption of Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, that the "practice was to presume that argument was 
waived unless requested." Certainly, this court has determined that the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure meet constitutional scrutiny. There is no doubt 
that the petitioner's constitutional right was not violated when the Utah 
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Court of Appeals determined that the trial court erred in granting the Dalton's 
motion for additur. 
There is no need for the appellate court to allow oral argument when the 
"facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record 
and the decisional process would not be significantly added by oral 
argument." Rule 29 (a)(3) of Appellate Procedure. On page 1 of the brief of 
appellee, the petitioner attacks this respondent's standard of review and sets 
forth his theory. Of course, that theory is the theme of Dalton's arguments 
throughout his extensive briefing. The petitioner, in his initial brief, cites 
Crookston in support of his position no less than sLx times. The emphasis 
continued in his petition for rehearing. Point I of that petition maintains that 
the Court of Appeals misunderstands the law. 
In light of all the emphasis by Dalton in his briefs before the Utah Court 
of Appeals, it is hard to imagine that oral argument would have aided in the 
slightest degree in persuading the Court of Appeals to change its decision and 
apply an unsupported theory which has been set forth by the petitioner. In 
addition, the record is clear that conflicting medical evidence on the necessity 
of future surgeries was presented to the jury. Unfortunately, that evidence 
was not appropriately marshaled by Dalton and ignored by the trial court. 
Oral argument obviously would not have persuaded the Court of Appeals to 
act contrary to the law and examine the trial court's memorandum decision in 
a vacuum without considering the evidence and the jury 's reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, as is being urged by Dalton. 
17 
CONCLUSION 
Herold urges this court to announce a standard of review for cases 
involving an additur by the trial court that gives deference to the jury's 
verdict. In the case at hand, however, under any possible standard of review, 
the trial court's additur should be stricken and the jury's verdict reinstated. 
DATED this 24th day of May, 1996. 
DUNN & D 
/Sw-
MARK DALTON DUNN 
KEVIN D. SWENSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
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Kule 4y LTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCFDURE 480 
whichever is applicable Any such motion which is filed before expiration of 
the prescribed time may be ex parte, unless the Supreme Court otherwise 
requires Notice of any such motion which is filed after expiration of the 
prescribed time shall be given to the other parties No extension shall exceed 
30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order 
granting the motion, whichever occurs later 
(0 The number of copies to be filed and served shall be the same as provided 
in Rule 26 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992) 
Amendment Notes — The 1992 amend substituted all the language after "which is" 
ment, effective October 1, 1992, in Subdivision for "juxiadictionally out of time" added Subdi 
(a) inserted 'final" in the first sentence ajid visions (d)(3), (d)(4), and (0. and made a styhs-
added the second sentence, in Subdivision (b) tic change 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
fault under this ruJe when he claimed that, due 
to his incarceration in Nevada, he had no rea 
aonable accesa to, or notice of, Utah appellaU 
rules and, thus, ho should be afforded the op 
portunity to prove that these circumstances did 
in fact exist for purposes of excujing the de-
fault. Dulin v Cook, 957 F 2d 758 (10th Cir 
1992) 
Rule 49. Petition for writ of certiorari . 
(a) Contents . The petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, in the order 
indicated 
(1) A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is 
sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case in the Su-
preme Court contains the names of all parties 
(2) A table of contents with page references 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and authorities 
cited, with references to the pages of the petition where they are cited 
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and 
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail The statement 
of the questions should be short and concise and should not be argumenta-
tive or repetitious General conclusions, such as "the decision of the Court 
of Appeals is not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable The 
statement of a question presented will be deemed to comprise every sub-
sidiary question fairly included therein Only the questions set forth in 
the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme 
Court 
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions 
issued by the Court of Appeals 
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court is invoked, showing 
(A) the date of the entry of the decision sought to be reviewed, 
(B) the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing and 
the date of the entry and terms of any order granting an extension of 
time within which to petition for certiorari, 
(C) reliance upon Rule 47(c), where a cross petition for a writ of 
certiorari is filed, stating the filing date of the petition for a writ of 
certiorari in connection with which the cross petition is filed, and 
(D) the statutory provision believed to confer jurisdiction on the 
Supreme Court 
(7) Controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, and 
regulations set forth verbatim with the appropriate citation If the ron, 
trolling provisions involved are lengthy, their citation alone will suffice 
ANALYSIS 
Procedural default 
—Cauae 
Procedural default 
—Cause 
Petitioner seeking federal habeaa review suf-
ficiently alleged "cause" for his procedural de-
4 8 1 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROLkUUKL U U K ^v, 
and their pertinent text shall be set forth in the appendix referred to in 
subparagraph (10) of this paragraph 
(8) A statement of the case The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings, and its disposition in 
the lov,er courts There shall follow a statement of the facta relevant to 
the issues presented for review All statements of fact and references to 
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record before 
and to the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
(9) With respect to each question presented, a direct and concise argu 
ment explaining the special and important reasons as provided in Rule 46 
for the issuance of the writ 
(10) An appendix containing, in the following order 
(A) copies of all opinions, including concurring and dissenting 
opinions, and all orders, including any order on rehearing, delivered 
by the Court of Appeals in rendering the decision sought to be re 
viewed, 
(B) copieB of any other opinions, findings of fact, conclusions of law 
orders, judgments, or decrees that were rendered in the case or lr 
companion cases by the Court of Appeals and by other courts or b> 
administrative agencies and that are relevant to the questions pre 
sented Each document shall include the caption showing the name o 
the issuing court or agency, the title and number of the case, and th( 
date of its entry, and 
(C) any other judicial or administrative opinions or orders that an 
relevant to the questions presented but were not entered in the cas< 
that is the subject of the petition 
If the material that is required by subparagraphs (7) and (10) of this para 
graph is voluminous, they may be separately presented 
(b) Form of peti t ion. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall comply witl 
the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27 
(c) No sepa ra t e brief. All contentions in support of a petition for a writ o 
certiorari shall be set forth in the body of the petition, as provided in subpara 
graph (a)(9) of this rule The petitioner shall not file a separate brief in sup 
port of a petition for a writ of certiorari If the petition is granted, the pet 
tioner will be notified of the date on which the brief in support of the merits c 
the case ia due 
(d) Pnge l imitation The petition for a writ of certiorari shall be as short o 
possible, but may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the tabl 
of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by subparagraph (a)(7) ( 
this rule, and the appendix 
(e) Absence of accuracy , brevi ty , and clari ty. The failure of a petitione 
to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a read 
and adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration will be 
sufficient reason for denying the petition 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992) 
Amendment Notes — The 1992 amend "and the clerk will refuse to file any petiti< 
ment, effecti\e October 1 1992, deleted Ian for a writ of certiorari to which is annexed 
fuag© from Subdivision (b) relating to co\er appended any supporting brief from the end 
color and requiring the clerk to return noncon the second sentence and added the third ee 
forming petitions, in Subdivision (c) deleted tence, and made several stylistic changes 
Rule 50. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amict 
curiae. 
(a) Brief in opposi t ion. Within 30 days after service of a petition tl 
respondent shall Tile an opposing brief, disclosing any matter or ground vvl 
the case should not be reviewed by the Supreme Court Such brief shall cor 
Ply with Rules 26(b), 27 and, as applicable, 49 
A-2 
A r t . I. ^ 10 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
occasions ovrr an extended period of t ime and st i tuted a single continuing violation. Sta te v. 
while in a po r t ion of t rust toward the victim. Star l ight Club. 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 
Suite v Copeland. 765 P 2d 1266 (Utah 19881. (1965). 
The fact tha t defendant, who was convicted 
of sodnmv on a child. was a victim of sexual J u v e n i l e p r o c e e d i n g s . 
abuse as a child did not make the imposition of T ^ ' 3 section ha.s application to cr iminal 
a tcn-vcar min imum manda to r s sentence cruel <**« w h c r c a presumption of innocence pre-
pun ishment as applied to him in contrast to v»»'s and does not apply to the proceedings in 
other nfT-ndcr* Sta te v Hai t ian . 765 P 2d 902 juvenile courts where incorrigible or delin-
(Utah lrJ.Q8) quent children are being trained and their 
habi ts corrected since juvenile court proceed-
E x c e s s i v e f ines. , n ? s arc civil and not cr iminal . Donald R. v. 
When a nonprofit corporate club violated the Whilmer ex rel Salt U k c County. 30 Utah 2d 
former Liquor Control Act several t imes by 206. 515 P.2d 617 (1973). 
selling intoxicating dr inks to a police officer 
and bis wife ovrr a three-wrek period, and the Voi r d i r e e x n m i n n t i o n . 
club w.n convicted of three separate violations. Individual, sequestered denth-qualificntion 
the imposition of thr^e maximum $2,500 fines voir dire of prospective juror* in n capital ho-
(making the total fine $7,500) was excessive micide case does not. in and of itself, violate 
since the offirer and his wife were engaged in a the defendant 's rights to a fair and impar t ia l 
s incle mission over the thrce-weck period, and jury. State v. Shaffer. 725 P 2d 1301 (Utah 
the d n n k s served them dur ing tha t period con- 1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
U t a h L a w R e v i e w . — The Courts , the Con- A.L.R. — Automobiles: validity and con-
st i tut ion, and Capital Pun i shment . 1968 Utah struction of legislation authorizing revocation 
L Rev 201. or suspension of operator's license for "habit-
Am. J i i r . 2d. — 8 Am. J u r 2d Bail nnd Re- „„! / • "persistent,"* or "frequent" violations of 
cojrni/nncr 5 74. traffic regulat ions. 18 A.L.R Kb 367. 
C I . S . - 8 C I S R a i l * 69. 22 C I S Cr.mi-
 K c y t \ u m h e r « . . - Rail t> 7. 
nal Law 5 21 et seq 
Sec 10. [Trial by jury.l 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of 
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. 
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall he unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
His to ry : C o n s L 1896. 
C r o s s - R c f c r e n c e s . — Civil actions, r ight to 
jury trial in. U.R.C.P.. Rules 38. 39. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Number of jurors . 
Paterni ty proceedings. 
Abatement of nuisance. Request for jury tr ial . 
Capital cases. Reversal of verdict. 
Civil cases. Unanimous verdict. 
— Nature of issue. Waiver of jury trial . 
Concurrence of three-fourths of jurors . 
Consolidation of actions. A b a t e m e n t of n u i s n n c e . 
Guilty plea. Former section regarding aba tement of 
.Judge's abrogation of jury 's function. brothel as nuisance, insofar as it provided for 
J u r y selection. imprisonment nnd author i rcd court in equity 
Injunction. proceedings to impose jail sentence, held un-
Nonsuit . consti tutional as violating this section. S ta te 
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ex rel Pincock v. Frankl in . 63 Utah 442. 226 
P 674 <1924) 
C a p i t a l c a s e s . 
Since the term "capital cases" as used in this 
section refers to a category of criminal actions, 
including the entire prosecution and not 
merely the penalty phase, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Fiirman v Georgia. 408 U S. 
238. 92 S Ct. 2726. 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 M972). 
affected only the punishment and not the na-
ture of the crime, defendant accused of 'capital 
offense" was entit led to be tried by a twelve-
man jurv. S la te v. J a m e s . 30 Utah 2d 32. 512 
P 2 d 1031 (1973). 
Civil cn«es . 
This section guaran tees the right of jury 
trial in civil cases Internat ional Harvester 
Credit Corp v Pioneer Tractor & Implement . 
Inc . 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981). 
The consti tutional r ight to a jury trial in 
civil cases extends only to cases that would 
have been cognizable at law at the time the 
consti tution was ndopted. /.ions First Nnt'l 
Rank v. Rockv Ml Irrigation. I n c . 138 Utah 
Adv Rep. 12 (1990). 
When legal and equitable issues turn on the 
same operative facts, a jury must decide the 
legal issue first: the jury 's factual determina-
tion binds the trial courl in its determinat ion 
of the parallel equitable issue Zions First Nnt'l 
Rank v. Rocky Ml. Irrigation. Inc., 138 Utah 
Adv. Rep 12 (1990) 
— N n t u r c of i s sue . 
Where a party 's claims on consolidation were 
realigned into affirmative defenses and coun-
terclaims, this rea l ignment did not change ihc 
na tu re of any issue from legal to equitable. 
Thus , the party should have been afforded its 
r ight to a jury trial on the legal issue. Zions 
First N a t l Rank v. Rocky Ml. Irr igation. Inc.. 
138 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (1990) 
C o n c u r r e n c e of Ihrec-four th .s of j u r o r s . 
In eminent domain proceedings, where, dur-
ing polling of jury, one juror answered tha t he 
did not concur in verdict and lhal he was not 
given sufficient time lo del iberate, court did 
not err in refusing to grant new trial because 
poll revealed six jurors did concur in verdict. 
S ta te ex rel. Road Comm'n v. Jensen . 22 Utah 
2d 214. 451 P.2d 370 (1969). 
C o n s o l i d a t i o n of a c t i o n s . 
An order for consolidation, for the determi-
nation of liability only, of eleven actions in-
volving nineteen plaintiffs, claiming damages 
for tr ichinosis contracted by ea t ing sausage 
prepared and sold by defendants did not violate 
this provision. Raggenbuck v. S u h r m a n n . 7 
Utah 2d 327. 325 P 2d 258 (1969). 
Gu i l ly p ica . 
A defendant may effectively enter a plea of 
guilty to any offense, including murder, and 
such plea certainly waives a jury trial . J u s t 
because the defendant has an inviolate consti-
tut ional r ight does not mean he is forced to 
accept it. S ta te v. M a g w e . 529 P 2d 421 (Ulah 
1974). 
J u d g e ' s n b r o g n l i o n of j u r y ' s func t ion . 
Const i tut ional provision gran t ing to accused 
p e n o n s right to trial by jury- extends to all of 
the facts that must be found to constitute the 
crime charged, and the r ight may not he in-
vaded by the judge indicating to the jury tha t 
any of such facts arc established by the evi-
dence. Sta te v Est rada. 119 Utah 339. 227 
P 2 d 247 (1951) 
. Jury se l ec t ion . 
Defendant's allegation without further proof 
tha t jurors in murder trial probably were se-
lected only from assessment roll of real prop-
erty owners did not establish tha t defendant 
was deprived of right to trial by impart ial jury. 
Sta te v Johnson. 25 Utah 2d 46. 475 P 2d 543 
M970) 
I n j u n c t i o n . 
In proceedings to obtain injunction, in ab-
sence of s ta tu te to contrary, there is no right to 
tr ial by jurv. Riggins v. District Court . 89 Utah 
183. 51 P.2d 645 t l935) . 
N o n s u i t . 
J u d g m e n t of npnsuit does not deprive plain-
tiff of bis consti tutional r ight to jury trial 
where facts undisputably show tha t plaintiff is 
not entit led to relief. Raymond v Union Pac. 
R R.. 113 Utah 26. 191 P 2d 137 (1948). 
N u m b e r of j u r o r s . 
Trial by eight jurors, as provided in this sec-
tion, instead of twelve did not deprive defen-
dant in gTand larceny proceeding of his r ights 
under the Sixth and Four teenth Amendments 
of the United S ta les Consti tut ion. Johnson v. 
Turner . 429 F 2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1970). 
In jury trial for noncapital offense defendant 
effectively waived trial by jury of eight by 
agreeing in open court to proceed with seven 
jurors after one had become ill. Sta le v. 
Heemer, 25 Utah 2d 69, 475 P.2d 1008 (1970). 
In a tr ial de novo on appeal from the city 
court to the district court the number of jurors 
is four. Sal t Lake Citv v West Gallerv. Inc . 
573 P.2d 1283 (Utah*1978). 
Defendants charged with driving under the 
influence of alcohol, a class 13 misdemeanor 
with maximvim possible imprisonment of six 
months , had no federally protected r ight to 
jury t r ia l , and therefore could claim no r ight to 
six-member panel as opposed to four-member 
juries which convicted them. Sta te v. Nut ta l l . 
611 P.2d 722 (Utah 1980) 
P n t e r n i t y p r o c e e d i n g s . 
There is no inheren t consti tut ional right to a 
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trial hv jury in paterni ty proceedings in this 
Male Hyntt v Mill. 714 P 2d 299 (Utah 1986). 
R e q u e s t for j u r y t r i a l . 
Where application for jury trial wa? not 
timely filed and no excuse.* were alleged or 
?hnwn explaining failure, there was no abuse 
of discretion on the part of the court in denying 
the belated request Board of F,duc. v. West. 55 
Utah 3.57. lgfi P. 114 (1919). 
In action at law to establish prescriptive 
f a s r m e n t . whrro plamtifT also asked for in-
junct ive relief, trial court erred in refusing 
timely request for jurv t r ial . Norback v. Board 
of Di'r?.. 84 Utah 506. 37 P.2d 339 H93-P. 
f>mand for jury trial was not defective be-
cause it failed to specify issues upon which jury 
(rial was desired, where there was no s ta tutory 
requi rement l n ' H issues be specified. Valley 
Mortuary v. Fa i rbanks . 110 Utah 204. 225 
P.2d 730 M9.50). (For p r e ^ n l law. see U.R.C.P.. 
Rule 3SfbU 
f t rvrrs. ' i l n( verdict . 
Where the facts indisputably establish no 
r ight to relief, the reversal by the Supreme 
Court of a judgment entered on a verdict in 
favnr of the plaintiff does not deprive the plain-
tiff of his consti tut ionally guaranteed right to a 
trial bv jurv . Creamer v. Ogden Union Hy. & 
Depot Co.. 121 Utah 406. 242 P.2d 575 (1952>. 
cert, denied. 344 U.S. 912. 73 S. Ct. 333 . 07 L. 
Kd. 703 (1953). 
U n a n i m o u s v e r d i c t . 
A jury does not have to be unan imous in de-
ciding which of the three culpable mental 
s la tes it finds in convicting of second-degree 
murder , as long as the decision is unan imous 
tha t one or another form of second-degree mur-
der was committed. S ta le v. Russell. 733 P.2d 
162 <Utah 1987); S la te v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 
254 (Utah 1988). 
Where defendant was convicted of first-dc-
gTee murder , and the jury* was instructed 
disjunctively as to the a l te rna t ive eva lua t ing 
c i rcumstances aggravat ing the offense, jury 
unan imi ty on the eva lua t ing circumstances 
was not required, the record having shown sub-
s tant ia l evidence to support all of the alternfl-
lives set forth in the instruct ions. S ta te v. 
T i l lman. 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1938). 
COLLATERAL 
U t a h L a w R e v i e w . — Right to Civil .Jury 
Trial in Utah: Consti tut ion and S ta tu te . 8 
Utah L. Rev. 07. 
Due Process S tandard of J u r y Impart ia l i ty 
Prer ludes Death-Qualification of .Jurors in 
Capital Cases. 1060 Utah L. Rev. 154. 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah — 
Wniver of j u r y Irinl. 
S ta tu te providing that demand was neces-
sary* for trial by jury was not in conflict with 
last provision in this section. SLate ex rel. 
Nichols v. Cherry. 22 Utah I. f>0 P. 1103 
U900). (For present law. see U.R.C.P.. Rule 
33(b).) 
Where c la imant to property sued Vo quiel ti-
tle, or in ejectment, his failure to demand jury 
trial waived right thereto. Gibson v. McGurrin. 
37 Utah 153. 106 P. 660 (1910). 
Under this section, court may. of its own mo-
tion, direct that a jury be impaneled, and the 
case be submitted to them in the usual way. 
even though both part ies expressly waive a 
jurv . Ogden Valley Trout & Resort Co. v. 
Lew,, . 41 Utah 183. 1S9. 125 P. 687 (1012). 
The provision that a jury is waived unless 
demanded is not for the benefit of an adver-
sary; therefore where a jury is in fact present, 
the adverse party cannot successfully object to 
a jury tr ial , and court may waive unt imely de-
mand and pavmcnl of jurv fee. Davis v. Denver 
* R . O R . R . . I 5 Utah I." 142 P 705 (1914). 
Where defendant not only failed to demand a 
jury tr ial , but minutes show tha t when plain-
tiffs demanded a jury for de terminat ion of 
questions of damages, in suit to enjoin n nui-
sance and for demnges. defendant resisted such 
demand, this amounts to n waiver of n ju ry 
trial . Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Producls 
Co.. 101 Utah 221. 137 P.2d 347 (1943). 
Under this section a jury trial in civil actions 
is waived unless demanded, and even then, un-
less the demand is made in the manner pro-
vided by s ta tu te , it is unavai l ing. Thompson v. 
Anderson. 107 Utah 331 . 153 P.2d 665 (1944). 
Court on its own motion could have called 
jury to trv personal injury case. Hunter v. 
Michael is .114 Utah 242. 198 P.2d 245 (1948). 
•Jury trial was not waived because demand 
therefor was general and failed to specify the 
issues upon which jury trial was desired. 
Vallev Mortuarv v. Fa i rbanks . 119 Utah 20-L 
225 P. 2d 739 (1950). 
There is no constitutional r ight to be tried 
without a jury; waiver of right to jury trial may 
be permitted in some instances, but defendant 
could not complain of trial judge's refusal to 
dismiss jurv at the close of s tate 's evidence. 
Sta te v. niack. 551 P.2d 518 (Utah 1976). 
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Key N u m b e r s . — J u r y *=> 9 et ceq. 
Ac t ion u n d e r Cft i l R i g h t s Act of 1871. 
Jurisdict ion over actions brought under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C. 1981 et 
seq.. is vested originally in the federal courts, 
but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by 
slate courts is not thereby prohibited; in view 
of the provisions of this section, therefore, it 
was error for trial court to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction otherwise proper action brought 
under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kish v. Wright . 562 P.2d 
625 (Utah 1977). 
Trial court would not err in dismissing ac-
tion brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on the 
gTound of forum non conveniens in a proper 
case, but such dismissal should be without 
prejudice so tha t the plaintiff might move his 
suit to another forum without harm to his 
claim. Kish v. Wright . 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 
1977). 
Ac t ions by c o u r t 
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open pro-
bate proceeding and to proceed against bond of 
adminis t ra t r ix where she has practiced extrin-
sic fraud on the court. Weyant v. Utah Sav. & 
Trust Co., 54 Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.L.R. 
1119 (1919). 
A c t i o n s by s tn to . 
This section did not al ter the law wilh re-
spect to certain r ights which arc vested in the 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall he open, and every person, for an injury clone to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall he administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall he barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
H i s t o r y : C o n s t 189f>. 
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